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The viability of democratic institutions depends on their ability
to respond to the changing needs and the changing environment of
the society in which they function. The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) is no exception to this basic precept. Innovations in
technology and merchandising techniques, the effects of new social
legislation, and the shifting attitudes of labor and management toward
each other have produced change. The decisions of the NLRB during
the 1960s reflect a recognition of these developments. The Board
has eschewed mechanistic and formalistic analysis and has attempted
instead to reach decisions on a case-by-case basis.
The Labor-Management Relations Act' is a complex statute based
on what is essentially a simple concept—that recognition of the right of
employees to organize for the purpose of bargaining collectively with
their employer is essential to industrial peace. Implicit in this right to
organize is the parallel right to refrain from organizing or engaging in
organizational activities. Section 7,2 the heart of the Act, guarantees
both rights. Section 8 3 prohibits certain defined unfair labor practices
by either employers or unions which could prevent the exercise of these
* A.B., Providence College, 1938; LL.B., Catholic University of America, 1941;
Member of the Rhode Island Bar; Member of the National Labor Relations Board. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Richard R. Brownstone, an attorney
with the National Labor Relations Board.
This article does not necessarily reflect the official position of the National Labor
Relations Board.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
3 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
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rights. Section 94
 establishes the procedures for the choice of a bar-
gaining representative.
The Board's paramount purpose is to insure that the rights guar-
anteed in section 7 and implemented by sections 8 and 9 are fully
realized—that employees are in fact free to join or not to join a union
guided solely by their own reasoned judgement. The Board's activities
to that end may be divided into three categories: ( 1 ) those directed
toward guaranteeing employee rights in the organizational or pre-
collective bargaining period, when it is being determined whether
employees desire to be represented by a union for purposes of col-
lective bargaining; (2) those directed toward facilitating the collective
bargaining process itself; and (3) those directed to the post-agreement
period and intended to promote the stability of the bargaining rela-
tionship.
In the 1960s there were significant developments in each of
these areas. In the representation cases the Board became more flex-
ible in the determination of units by removing arbitrary impediments
to organization. It made the election process more effective by improv-
ing channels of communication between unions, employers and em-
ployees. It provided unit clarification procedures for units that had
arisen through voluntary actions of the parties. In unfair labor prac-
tice cases, the Board broadened and clarified the areas in which
bargaining may be required. It tried to cushion the impact on em-
ployees of changes in the ownership of a business, and it increased
the job retention rights of strikers. Correlatively, the Board recog-
nized the right of an employer, under certain circumstances, to lock out
his employees in order to enhance his bargaining position. The Board
also instituted significant changes in the union's duty to represent
fairly all employees in a unit and clarified the rights of unions, in cer-
tain circumstances, to discipline and fine their members. And since it is
important not only to decide cases in conformity with the statute,
but also to provide prompt, effective remedies, the Board devised new
remedies to meet new situations, and more effective procedures to
expedite the disposition of the many cases which came to the Board
during the decade.
The purpose of this article is to examine the significant Board
and Supreme Court labor law decisions during the 1960s. This article
is not intended to provide an exhaustive survey of the field of labor
law during the past decade, but, rather, to highlight a number of is-
sues which arose during the 1960s and which will be of increasing
importance in the 1970s. After discussing representation cases, the
article will concentrate upon some of the more significant develop-
4 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
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ments in unfair labor practice cases. Attention will then be focused
upon a few cases dealing with the Board's jurisdiction and with the
Board's formulation of appropriate, effective remedies. Finally, two
solutions for alleviating the enormous caseload which the Board has
been required to handle during recent years will be proposed.
I. UNION REPRESENTATION CASES
Section 9 5 of the Act establishes the conditions under which the
Board conducts an election, and the standards to be utilized in the
determination of the appropriate units in which such elections are
held. There have been three major substantive developments regarding
representation cases during the 1960s: (1) the increasing flexibility
of unit determinations; (2) the development of the unit clarification
procedure; and (3) the Excelsior rule.
A. Increased Flexibility of Unit Determinations
The statute, aside from providing a few general guidelines, does
not offer specific rules for the determination of appropriate bargaining
units. The basic criterion is whether the unit designated is one which
assures the employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by the Act.' There is also the negative criterion of Section
9(c) (5) of the Act,7 which provides that the extent of the union's
organization shall not be controlling. Because of the statute's lack of
specificity, the Board, through the years, has created a body of deci-
sional law interpreting these general criteria. 8
It has been recognized that bargaining can proceed in many units
in any given organization—that while one unit may indeed be more
effective than another, there may be several possible units which could
conduct collective bargaining successfully. In the 1960s the Board
stopped seeking perfection in its choice of appropriate units and sought
instead to encourage collective bargaining by permitting the establish-
ment of units that might not, perhaps, be the best possible, but which
nonetheless held out the possibility that collective bargaining could
be effectively conducted. The Board sought to establish units com-
prised of groups of employees with separate and identifiable interests.
5 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
6 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
7 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1964).
8 The Board's unit determinations are judicially reviewable only in an unfair labor
practice proceeding arising from the employer's refusal to bargain with the chosen unit.
On review, the Board's determinations are given great weight, subject to the requirement
that it has articulated clearly the reasons for its decision. For a case in which the Supreme
Court rejected a Board determination because the Board had failed to articulate the
reasons behind its choice of a unit, see NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Ca., 380 U.S.
438 (1965).
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In deciding this question, the NLRB has considered such factors as
the structure of the industry, the content of the jobs, and the impact
of changing technology. This flexible, case-by-case approach is exem-
plified by the Board's treatment of truckdrivers, 9 driver salesmen,"
and technical employees." The Board also utilized this approach in
the establishment of new and smaller units in cases involving insur-
ance companies," department stores," and retail chains."
In the insurance industry, the Board for 17 years had applied a
rule that required unions to organize insurance agents on a state-wide
basis." In 1961 the Board concluded that its policy in this area was
hampering rather than assisting employees in the exercise of their
statutory right to bargain through a union. The Board therefore
changed its rule and recognized a unit of agents at one district office
of the Quaker City Life Insurance Company." The Board's position
now is that such a local unit, although appropriate, need not be the
only appropriate unit, and that organization is possible on several
different bases so long as the union's extent of organization is not the
controlling factor."
In retail store cases the Board no longer insists that the appro-
priate unit must conform to the employer's administrative or geo-
graphic divisions." In Say-On Drugs' the Board abandoned this policy
and found that a separate retail outlet was an appropriate unit for
collective bargaining. The Board announced that it would henceforth
apply to retail chain operations the same unit considerations applied
to multi-plant operations in general." In Frisch's Big Bay Ill-Mar,
Inc. the Board interpreted Say-On as establishing a presumption that
single store units are appropriate. 21
In department store cases the Board scrutinized the disparate
interests between selling and non-selling employees. For many years
the Board had consistently held that store-wide units were the most
9 See, e.g., E. H. Koester Bakery Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1006, 49 L.R.R.M. 1925 (1962).
10 See, e.g., Plaza Provision Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 910, 49 L.R.R.M. 1295 (1961).
11 See, e.g., Sheffield Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1101, 49 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1961).
12 See, e.g., Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 960, 49 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1961).
13 See, e.g., Allied Stores, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 799, 58 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1965).
14 See, e.g., Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1962);
Purity Food Stores, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 63 L.R.R.M. 1007 (1966).
15 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635, 14 L.R.R.M. 187 (1944).
16 See note 12 supra.
17 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408, 61 L.R.R.M. 1249, 1251
(1966).
18 See, e.g., Daw Drug Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1316, 46 L.R.R.M. 1218 (1960); Robert
Hall Clothes, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1096, 40 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1957); Father & Son Shoe
Stores, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B 1479, 40 L.R.R.M. 1032 (1957).
19 See note 14 supra.
20 138 N.L.R.B. at 1033, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
21 147 N.L.R.B. 551 n.1, 56 L.R.R.M. 1246, 1247 n.1 (1964).
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appropriate in this industry, and had carved out from such units only
homogeneous groups of employees possessing a community of interest
because of their distinctive skills.' But in three companion cases de-
cided in 1965 the Board majority approved separate units of selling,'
non-selling,24 restaurant,' and clerical employees" in retail depart-
ment stores. In reaching this result, the Board noted that less-than-
storewide units were part of the current industrial bargaining pattern
in department stores, and that even those store-wide units that did
exist were often the culmination of a history of organization of smaller
units." The Board concluded that
[t] he specific facts of these cases, the current bargaining
pattern in the industry, the history of bargaining in the area,
and a close examination of the composition of the work force
in the industry require a recognition of the existing differ-
ences in work tasks and interests between selling and non-
selling employees in department stores."
It may seem somewhat anomalous to discuss the Board's Mal-
linckrodt' decision as another example of flexibility, particularly in
view of my dissents in Mallinckrodt" and in numerous cases applying
the doctrine." Yet a case can be made for the position that Mal-
linckrodt is such an example.
In Mallinckrodt, the Board undertook a re-examination of the
American Potash32
 doctrine under which, since 1954, it had been de-
ciding craft severance cases. American Potash was a rejection of what
had come to be known as the National Tube" doctrine, which was an
interpretation of a provision of Section 9(b) (2) of the Taft-Hartley
Act," passed in response to the Board's American Can" decision.
These changes in Board policy demonstrate that the issue of
22 See, e.g., Maas Bros., Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1886, 39 L.R.R.M. 1120 (1956).
23 Allied Stores, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 799, 58 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1965); Arnold Constable
Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 788, 58 L.R.R.M. 1086 (1965).
24 Id. See also Lord & Taylor, 150 N.L.R.B. 812, 58 L.R.R.M. 1088 (1965).
23 Allied Stores, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 799, 58 L.R,R.M. 1081 {196.5); Arnold Constable
Corp. 150 N.L.R.B. 788, 58 L.R.R.M, 1086 (1965).
26 Arnold Constable Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 788, 58 L.R.R.M. 1086 (1965).
27 Allied Stores, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 799, 803-04, 58 L.R.R.M. 1081, 1082-83.
28 Id. at 806, 58 L.R.R.M. at 1084.
29 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
80 Id. at 400-07, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1017-21.
81 See, e.g., Lear-Siegler, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 67 L.R.R.M. 1522 (1968);
Mobil Oil Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 67 L.R.R.M. 1154 (1968) ; Holmberb, Inc., 162
N.L.R.B. 407, 64 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1966).
32 American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 33 L.R.R.M. 1380 (1954).
83 National Tube Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1199, 21 L.R.R.M. 1292 (1948).
84 29
	 § 159(b)(2) ( 1964).
25 American Can Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1252, 4 L.R.R.M. 392 (1939).
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separate representation of assertedly distinctive groups, as opposed
to their inclusion in a larger unit, is not amenable to simple solution.
It can be argued that larger groupings are per se more effective, that
the plant-wide or company-wide unit is an optimum one that tends
more to equalize bargaining power, and therefore ought to be en-
couraged rather than destroyed. It can with equal validity be argued
that there are, within any large organization, certain groups so differ-
ent in their skills, interests, and needs that they ought to be afforded,
at the least, the opportunity to select a separate representative able
to represent their particular interests.
Mallinckrodt established a test which considered arguments both
for and against craft severance," and thus the decision can be con-
sidered a flexible response to the problem. The Board concluded that
American Potash shackled the Board and compelled the granting of
severance whenever it was shown that the unit sought consisted of
craftsmen and that the union seeking to represent them was one that
traditionally represented that group. 37 In American Potash considera-
tion was not given to the bargaining history at the particular plant,
the distinctive functions of the proposed craft, the extent to which the
craft had established or sought a separate identity, and the extent of
integration of the production process. Mallinckrodt made all of these
criteria relevant, and, to that extent, encouraged a case-by-case ap-
proach in which all relevant factors are discriminatingly appraised."
It is thus clear that the trend in these Board decisions is toward
the establishment of a greater variety of units to accomplish the stat-
utory objective. It is essential, however, that the Board continue to
rethink this problem and make changes in its policies when experience
shows that prior decisions are obstructing bargaining in specific areas,
particularly in view of the primary responsibility that Congress has
given it—to determine units which provide employees the fullest free-
dom in collective bargaining.
B. Unit Clarification Procedures
A necessary concomitant of the Board's statutory power to cer-
tify appropriate bargaining units is its power to clarify the status of
certain disputed classifications of employees. In Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen and Enginemen, 39
 the Board overruled The Bell Tel.
3. 8 162 N.L.R.B. at 397, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
37 Id. at 396, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1015-16.
38 As my dissents in Mallinckrodt and later cases make clear, I do not subscribe
either to the doctrine or the way in which it has been applied.
For another critique of the Board's application of Mallinckrodt, see Abodeely, NLRB
Craft Severance Policies: Preeminence of the Bargaining History Factor After Mal-
linckrodt, 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 411 (1970).
39 145 N.L.R.B. 1521, 55 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1964).
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Co.," case and decided that it would thereafter clarify units that
had arisen through voluntary actions of the parties as well as units
it had originally certified." The Board's rules and regulations
were subsequently amended to formalize these procedures, providing
that petitions could be filed for amendment and clarification of units,
whether originally certified or voluntarily recognized. 42 This procedure
is applicable only when there is no question concerning the representa-
tion of the employees whose placement is in doubt. If the Board de-
cides that there is such a question, the clarification or amendment
petition will be dismissed and an election will be ordered to ascertain
the wishes of the employees.
Most of the cases which arise under this clarification procedure
involve accretions, that is, new classifications of employees arising
after the establishment of the collective bargaining relationship which
have not, therefore, been specifically placed. If they share a com-
munity of interests with an existing unit, the Board will place them in
that unit without an election. However, if the classification of em-
ployees existed at the time the bargaining relationship began, such
employees would generally be entitled to an election and would not
be placed by means of a clarification procedure.
A possibly unforeseen result of clarification procedures, and one
which will have significance in the future, is the Libbey-Owens-Ford
Glass Ca.' case. There, the union, representing multi-location units,
wished to merge them into one employer-wide unit. Since the employer
would not acquiesce, the union filed a clarification petition seeking the
merger. The employer argued that the appropriate procedure would
require the union to file a representation petition, not a clarification
petition." The Board majority decided to conduct self-determination
elections in which the employees could decide whether they wished
to be represented separately or by a multi-plant employer wide unit.'
Thus, this decision was the first one in which the Board sanctioned an
election in spite of the fact that there were no representational issues.
One recent case decided by the Board suggests that very difficult prob-
lems will arise as unions test how far this principle can be extended."
40 118 N.L.R.B. 371, 40 L.R.R.M. 1179 (1957).
41 145 N.L.R.B. at 1524, 55 L.R.R.M. at 1178.
42 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (1969).
4a 169 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 67 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1968). See also McCulloch v. Libbey-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916, 68 L.R.R.M. 2447 .(D.C. Cir. 1968). But see PPG
Indus., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 73 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1969).
44 169 N.L.R.B. No. 2, at 5, 67	 at 1097.
45 Id. at 9, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1098.
46 Cities Serv. Oil Co., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 73 L.R.R.M. 1598 (1970).
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C. The Excelsior47
 Rule
The determination of units is only the first step in the process
of choosing a representative. The Board also regulates the tactics and
arguments which can be used by the employer and union during the
days preceding the election. Section 8(c) of the Act provides:
The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic,
or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an un-
fair labor practice under any of the provisions of this sub-
chapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit."
This section guarantees the employer's right to campaign vigorously
against union representation of his employees." The Supreme Court
has decided, however, that this right is not without limits and that it
must never override the basic right of employees to a free election. 5°
The Board, considering this fundamental right, decided that an em-
ployee who has had an effective opportunity to hear the arguments
of the employer and the union concerning representation is in a better
position to make a more fully informed and reasonable choice." The
Excelsior rule was intended to accomplish this result by removing an
obstacle to communication between a petitioning union and employees.
The rule states that within seven days of either entry into a con-
sent election agreement or the ordering of an election by the Board, the
employer shall file with the regional director a list containing the
names and addresses of all eligible voters. The regional director in
turn shall make this information available to all parties in the case.
Failure to comply with this requirement constitutes a basis for setting
aside the election. 52
The rule engendered much litigation, but for the most part was
sustained in the courts of appeals." However, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, although indicating its approval of the rule as a matter of
substance, decided that it was invalid because it was not adopted in
47
 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1966).
48 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
49 See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
50 Id. at 617.
51 156 N.L.R.B. at 1240, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1218.
52 Id. at 1239, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1218.
53 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 384 F.2d 188, 66 L.R.R.M. 2264
(4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968); NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d .52, 66
L.R.R.M. 2481 (7th Cir. 1967); Howell Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 213, 69 L.R.R.M.
2032 (5th Cir. 1968)
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conformity with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act.54 The Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit that the rule
was adopted by an improper procedure but nevertheless sustained the
application of the rule."
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A major part of the Board's work is the adjudication and rem-
edy of unfair labor practices. Under the Wagner Act, only unfair labor
practices by employers were proscribed. The 1947 Taft-Hartley amend-
ments proscribed certain unfair labor practices by unions." The 1959
Landrum-Griffin Amendments added further detail to those latter prac-
tices."
This article. will not discuss, or even attempt to summarize, all
that has transpired in the unfair labor practice cases. Rather, it will
concentrate upon significant events which have developed with respect
to two employer unfair practices—section 8(a) (3), which forbids en-
couragement or discouragement of union membership by discrimina-
tion in hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment," and section 8(a) (5), which makes it an unfair labor
practice to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of
the employees." Consideration will also be given to one union unfair
practice, section 8(b) (1) (A) which forbids coercion of employees in
the exercise of their section 7 rights."
A. Section 8(a)(3)
The simplest case of a section 8(a) (3) violation is the discharge of
a union adherent because of his union activity." It would seem to fol-
low from this simple case that if an employer were to shut down his
business completely, thus discharging all his employees because they
had chosen a union to represent them, a fortiori there would be a
violation of section 8 (a) (3). That precise issue was presented to the
54 Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 394, 397, 67 L.R.R.M. 2483, 2485 (1st
Cir. 1968).
55 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 (1969). For an excellent dis-
cussion of this case, see Comment, Rule-Making and Adjudication in Administrative
Policy Making: NLRB v. Wyman -Gordon Co., 11. B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 64 (1969).
59 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 141-42 (1947), amending
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
67 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 542-44
(1959), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158, 159 (1964).
58 29	 § 158(a)(3)	 (1964).
59 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
eo 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1964).
61 This type of case constitutes the bulk of the unfair labor practice cases before
the Board. In the period from 1960-1969, back pay awards to remedy such discharges
exceeded $32,000,000.
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Supreme Court in the Darlington"" case. There, the Court held that
an employer has the right to terminate his business for any reason
whatsoever, including anti-union animus.° The Court asserted how-
ever that when an employer with such motivation closes only a part
of his business, this action may be violative of section 8(a) (3) if the
employer may reasonably have foreseen that such a closing would
likely have a "chilling effect" upon organizational activities at the
remaining plants." The Court remanded the case to the Board so that
it could make a finding with respect to the purpose and effect of the
closing.°
The Board upon remand conducted a further hearing, and upon
review of the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision, held that the
closed Darlington plant was part of a larger enterprise, and that the
closing was under circumstances which established the purpose and
effect of chilling unionism in other plants of the employer." It there-
fore held that this closing was in violation of section 8(a)(3)." The
Board has, however, strictly interpreted the Darlington standard, and
in subsequent cases has stressed the importance of establishing a spe-
cific discriminatory motivation before finding that a partial closing
of an employer's business is an unfair labor practice."
The Darlington requirement of a specific anti-union animus con-
trasts with the holdings in other Supreme Court cases. In 1954 the
Court held that specific proof of motivation is not required but will
be presumed, where the type of discrimination inherently discourages
or encourages union membership." Then, in 1961 in the Local 357
case the Court held that while there were circumstances from which
the Board could infer a discriminatory motivation, the inference was
not permissible because the hiring hall agreement under consideration
contained specific language to the contrary."
In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.," the Court again found that the
circumstances of the case were sufficiently clear to eliminate the need
for specific evidence of an intent to discriminate. There, the employer
granted super-seniority to replacements for strikers and to strikers
62 Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
C3 Id. at 273-74.
64 rd. at 275.
65 Id. at 277.
66 Darlington Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1074, 65 L.R.R.M. 1391, 1405 (1969).
67 Id. at 1086, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1404, aff'd, Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d
760, 68 L.R.R.M. 2356 (4th Cir. 1968).
09 See, e.g., Morrison Cafeterias Consof., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 71 L.R.R.M.
1449 (1969); Motor Repair, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 67 L.R.R.M. 1051 (1967); A.C.
Rochat Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 421, 64 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1967).
69 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRI3, 347 U.S. 17, 52 (1954).
79 Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1961).
71 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
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who returned to work before the strike ended. Although the right to
strike must be protected, it is not entirely without limits. For example,
the Mackay" rule permits an employer permanently to replace eco-
nomic strikers. In Erie Resistor, however, the Court found the em-
ployer's plan inherently discriminatory." Its consequences were such
that the employer must have both foreseen and intended them, and
its effect upon the right to strike was so devastating, that the Court
found a violation of section 8(a) (3) without proof of specific intent
to discriminate."
In American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held
that, absent a showing of discriminatory intent, an employer may tem-
porarily lock out his employees in support of his bargaining position
during a bargaining impasse." Assuming no motivation to discourage
union activity or to evade bargaining, the test is whether the lockout
is so inherently prejudicial to union interest and so devoid of signifi-
cant economic justification that no evidence of intent is necessary."
The Court found that the purpose and effect of the lockout were to
bring pressure to bear on the union to cause it to modify its economic
demands and to accept the employer's legitimate demands. 77 Thus,
the Court held that the employer had not committed an unfair labor
practice.78
Since the Board's view prior to American Ship had been that only
a defensive lockout under special circumstances was permissible,"
American Ship compelled a rethinking and reassessment of the prob-
lem. One of the first cases to reconsider the question was The Evening
News Ass'n," where two newspapers, The Free Press and The News
were involved in negotiations with the same union. Although there was
not a two-company unit, the crucial demands on each paper were al-
most identical. When the union struck The Free Press, The News
locked out its employees. Because of the similarity in demands be-
ing pressed upon both newspapers, the deadlock on significant is-
72 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
73 373 U.S. at 335-36.
74
 Id. at 231-32.
75 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965); accord, NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 282-83 (1965).
78 380 U.S. at 311-12 (by implication).
77 380 U.S. at 312.
78 Id. The Supreme Court, at the same time it decided American Ship, which involved
only one employer, also decided NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965). Brown involved
multi-employer bargaining. After a whipsaw strike was called against one employer, the
other employers in the unit locked out their employees, and then, following the struck
employer's lead, they resumed operations with temporary replacements. The Court found
this conduct part of an acceptable defensive measure to preserve the integrity of the
multi-employer unit against the whipsaw. Id. at 284.
79 See, e.g., International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907, 27 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1951);
Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 46 N.L.R.B. 1335, 12 L.R.R.M. 151 (1943).
80 166 N.L.R.B. 219, 65 L.R.R.M. 1425 (1967).
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sues, and the threat of a strike at The News, the Board held that The
News was justified in locking out its employees." The Board clearly
indicated, however, that it was not establishing' any hard and fast
rules as to the general legality or illegality of various types of lockouts,
but rather intended to judge each of them on a case-by-case basis."
In Darlington & Co.' the Board further extended the scope of
permitted lockouts. While American ship involved a lockout after a
bargaining impasse, in Darlington the lockout occurred' before the im-
passe. Because of this distinction, the Trial Examiner . held American
Ship inapplicable and the lockout illegal. Reviewing the underlying
principles of American ship, the Board held that the presence or ab-
sence of an impasse in negotiations does not automatically determine
the legality of a lockout, but is merely one factor to be considered."
The Board then found that the employer had locked out its employees
in support of its bargaining position and to avoid a strike that might
have occurred during the busy shipping season.85 The Board dismissed
the complaint, and after noting that the Supreme Court had said in
American Ship.that the right to strike does not include the right ex:.
elusively to determine the timing and duration of all work stoppages,
the Board concluded that the lockout was neither inherently prejudi-
cial to union interests nor devoid of significant economic justifica
tion."
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. 87 represents further develop-
ment of the motivation concept in employer discrimination cases. The
unfair labor practice, as the majority of the Court saw it, 88 was based
on the employer's payment under the terms of an expired contract
of accrued vacation benefits to some employees who met the con-
tractual requirements, but not to others." The employer had refused
to pay the vacation benefits to those strikers who had not returned
to work by a company-determined date during the strike. The Court
stated that paying "accrued benefits to one group of employees while
announcing the extinction of the same benefits for another group of
employees who are distinguishable only by their participation in pro-
tected concerted activity surely may have a discouraging effect on
either present or future concerted activity!'" But, the Court noted,
81 Id. at 222, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1427.
82 Id .
Ss 171 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 68 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1968).
84 Id. at 6, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
85 Id.
Ss Id. at 7, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
87 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
88 Justices Harlan and Stewart, in dissent, thought the Court had decided an issue
not properly before it. Id. at 35-36.
89 Id. at 27.
99 Id. at 32.
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under American Ship and Erie Resistor the question of employer mo-
tivation for the discriminatory conduct must still be examined before
finding a violation of section 8(a) (3). 91
 There are cases where moti-
vation can be inferred from the very nature of the conduct, and some
where the employer may be able to establish legitimate and substantial
business justification for the conduct.92
 In Great Dane the employer
offered no evidence as to its motivation, and therefore .the violation
was established without deciding to which class this case belonged."
In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.," the Supreme Court ap-
plied Great Dane to the re-employment of economic strikers. When
the six strikers involved in the case applied for reinstatement there
were no jobs available. However, after their applications had, been
made, the employer hired six new employees to fill jobs the striker-
applicants were qualified to fill. The complaint alleged, and the Trial
Examiner found, violations of sections 8(a) (3) and • 8(a) (1) in the
hiring of the six new employees instead of the strikers." After the
Board affirmed," the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that the rights of the strikers were to be judged as of the day
they applied for reinstatement." Since there were no jobs then avail-
able, there was no vioIation.98
 The Supreme Court reversed," refer-
ring to Great Dane and stating that the denial of reinstatement to
strikers here was no less destructive of employee rights than the re-
fusal to make vacation payments in Great Dane.n° As the employer
had not shown any justification, there was an unfair labor practice
without reference to intent."' The Court also made clear that the
right of a striker to reinstatement does not expire when there is no
job at the moment he applies. 102 He remains an employee until he
obtains other substantially equivalent regular employment, and his
right to an offer of reinstatement until then is defeated only by a
showing of legitimate and substantial business justification.'"
Before Fleetwood the Board had applied Mackay rather literally,
determining the economic striker's rights as of the date of his ap-
91 Id. at 33.
92 Id. at 33-34.
93 Id. at 34-35.
94 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
95 Fleetwood Trailer Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 425, 428, 59 L.R.R.M. 1492 (1965).
96 Id. at 425, 59 L.R.R.M. at 1492 (1965).
97 NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 366 F.2d 126, 129, 63 L.R.R.M. 2155, 2157
(9th Cir. 1966).
98 Id. at 130, 63 L.R.R.M. at 2158.
99 389 U.S. at 381.
3.99 Id. at 380.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 380-81.
193 Id. at 381.
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plication.'" But after Fleetwood and Great Dane, the Board was
compelled to reassess its position. In the Laidlow Corp. case the Board
therefore held that, regardless of intent, an employer cannot lawfully
ignore outstanding applications for reinstatement from strikers, and
hire new applicants, absent legitimate and substantial business rea-
sons.'" The Board further noted that when vacancies occur, a refusal
to consider or reinstate strikers who have been replaced is in effect
a delayed discrimination which does not become lawful simply because
there was the intervening lawful hiring of a permanent replacement.'
B. Section 8(a)(5)
Although Section 8(a) (3) of the Act has usually been considered
the most important unfair labor practice provision, section 8(a) (5)
(dealing with the employer's refusal to bargain collectively with repre-
sentatives of his employees) has, during the 1960s, become equally
significant. In fact, during the past decade there have been major
developments in all aspects of the law affecting the bargaining relation-
ship—its establishment, its duration, and the mandatory subjects of
bargaining.
1. The Establishment of the Bargaining Relationship
In Bernel Foam Prods. Co.107 the Board, reversing the Aiello
Dairy Farms case,108 held that a majority union which participates in
an election with knowledge of the employer's unlawful refusal to ex-
tend recognition and bargain, and loses that election, is not precluded
from filing a section 8(a) (5) unfair labor practice charge based on the
employer's pre-election misconduct, provided that it can present
meritorious objections to the election. 10° The effect of Bernel was to
precipitate a number of cases in which the Board was called upon to
determine whether the union could in fact demonstrate majority status,
usually by authorization cards it had obtained during its organizational
campaign, and whether the employer's motivation in refusing recog-
nition was based upon a good faith doubt as to the majority status of
the union."°
104 See, e.g., Brown & Root, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 486, 48 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1961);
Atlas Storage Div., P&V Atlas Indus. Center, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1175, 36 L.R.R.M. 1171
(1955); Bartlett-Collins Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 395, 35 L.R.R.M. (1954).
105 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, at 10, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252, 1257 (1968).
106 Id. at 10 n.16, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1258 n.16.
107 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 56 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1964).
108 110 N.L.R.B. 1365, 35 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1954).
109 146 N.L.R.B. at 1282-83, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1042. See also Irving Air Chute Co.,
149 1N.L.R.B, 627, 629-30, 57 L.R.R.M. 1330, 1332 (1964).
110 See, e.g., Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, 54 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1963).
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In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,m the Supreme Court resolved
some of the problems which were created by the Bernel Foam decision.
The Court held that union authorization cards, if obtained from a
majority of the employees without misrepresentation or coercion, gen-
erally are reliable enough to provide a valid method of determining
majority status."= The Court also determined that a bargaining order
is an appropriate remedy where the employer rejects the union's card
majority while at the same time committing unfair labor practices
which tend to undermine the union's majority and to impede the
election process.'" In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished
three types of situations:
1. It noted those cases in which the employer's violations are
so serious that even in the absence of a section 8(a)(5) violation, a
bargaining order is the only effective remedy. Regarding this category
of cases the Court left undecided the question of whether it is neces-
sary to establish a union majority prior to issuance of the order.'"
2. In cases in which the employer's unfair practices are less
damaging to the union but still have the tendency to undermine
majority strength and impede the election process, the Court noted
that it is necessary to establish that at one time the union in fact had
a majority, because the Board has the dual goals of effectuating the
employees' free choice and deterring the employer's misbehavior. In
choosing a remedy the Board must therefore
take into consideration the extensiveness of an employer's
unfair practices in terms of their past effect on election con-
ditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the future.
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects
of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair
rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present,
is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through
cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargain-
ing order, then such an order should issue.'"
3. In other cases the unfair labor practices have such a minimal
111 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
112
 Id. at 603. The Court approved the Board's statement of its position on the
validity of cards as set out in Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338
(1968). It is to be noted that none of the cases included in Gisse2 involved ambiguous,
dual-purpose cards, and the Court therefore expressed no opinion on how such cards are
to be handled.
113 395 U.S. at 610.
114
 Id. at 613-14. In NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570, 66
L.R.R.M. 2596, 2603 (4th Cir. 1967), the court stated that in a case marked by suffi-
ciently outrageous unfair labor practices, a bargaining order would be appropriate even
if the union had never attained a majority.
115 395 U.S. at 614-15.
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effect on the election process that they will not justify a bargaining
order."'
While Gissel did not, of course, solve all the problems in deter-,
mining majority status, it made clear that the basic test the Board is
to use is not the subjective test of the employer's motivation in
refusing to bargain with a union, but rather the objective test of the
extent to which the employer's conduct made it impossible to conduct
an election.
The problem of determining who may actually engage in bargain-
ing has become significant in view of the increase in what has been
described as "coordinated bargaining," that is, bargaining by several
unions which represent employees of one company. In General Elec.
'Co. the Board held that the company need only bargain with the union
with whiCh it was scheduled to bargain at that time, although that
union could bring in representatives of other unions as advisors in its
negotiations. 11T The Second Circuit enforced the Board's order and
upheld the Board's ruling that a mixed-union negotiating committee
is not per se improper, and that, absent a showing of substantial evi-
dence of ulterior motive or bad faith on the part of the union, an
employer commits an unfair labor practice in refusing to deal with
such a group. 1 1' Such evidence may be difficult to obtain, but the court
notedli° that such a determination can be made, and in fact had been
made in the Kennecott Copper case.'2° The court's decision indicates
that the Board will be faced with difficult problems if and when there
are attempts to extend_ this union bargaining technique beyond estab-
lished limits.
2. Subjects of Bargaining
Section 8(d) of the Act states that the basic bargainable matters
are wages, hours, and conditions of employ -rnent.121 In NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner, 122 the Supreme Court made the funda-
mental distinction between mandatory subjects of bargaining, as to
. which a party may insist on its position to the point of impasse, and
'non-mandatory subjects on which the agreement to a contract may
not be conditioned. The Court further indicated that refusal to agree
11° Id. at 615.
117 General Elec. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, at 8-9, 69 L.R.R.M. 1305, 1308 (1968).
See also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co, 173 N.LRB, No. 47, 69 L.R.R.M. 1313 (1968).
118 General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 519-20, 71 L.R.R.M. 2418, 2423
, (2d Cir. 1969).
110 412 F.2d at.519, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2423-24.
120 Kennecott Copper Co., No. 27-CB-453, 70 L.R.R. 427 (April 4, 1969).
121
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
122 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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to a contract because it does not contain a non-mandatory subject
is an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 8(a) (5)."
During the 1960s the Board has had many opportunities to
distinguish between mandatory and non-mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining. In making these distinctions, the Board has recognized that
the label attached to a subject of bargaining is not immutable. For
example, in 1948 the Board decided that pension plans had then be-
come a mandatory 'subject." In 1969 society and the economy had
changed to such an extent that the Board decided that retired em-
ployees are "employees" within the meaning of the statute for the
purpose of bargaining about changes in their retirement benefits, and
that bargaining about such changes is in any event within the con-
templation of the statute because of the interest that active employees
have in retirement benefits. The Board thus concluded that this sub-
ject was also a bargainable matter.'
The most significant development in classifying subjects of bar-
gaining was clearly the Fibreboard126 decision. There, the Supreme
Court held that the contracting out of unit work was well within the
literal meaning of "terms and conditions of employment," and that
therefore contracting out is a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining.' 27
 The Court did not purport to cover all forms of subcon-
tracting, a term which has, as it noted, many meanings. However,
in Fibreboard it did require bargaining not only about the decision to
subcontract, but also about the effect of the decision on unit employees.
The doctrine is limited, however, to those situations in which the
contracting involves a change in prior practice, or will result in a
significant impairment of job tenure, employment security, or reason-
ably anticipated work opportunities for unit employees. 12
123 Id. at 349.
124
 Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 21 L.R.R.M. 1310 (1948), enforced, 170 F.2d
247, 22 L.R.R.M. 2506 (7th Cir. 1948).
125 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 71 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1969):
126
 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
121 Id. at 203.
128 The Fibreboard decision has also had an impact on § 8(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e) (1964), generally called the "hot cargo" provision. In District Council of Car-
penters, 149 N.L.R.B. 646, 57 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1964), the Board considered the validity
of a clause which provided that no member of the union would handle any doors which
had been fitted prior to being furnished on the job, and held it valid because it was
designed to preserve for the employees work which they had customarily performed.
After the court of appeals reversed the Board, National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 354 F.2d 594, 60 L.R.R.M. 2458 (7th Cir. 1965), the Supreme Court upheld the
Board, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). The Court noted that under its Fibreboard decision, sub-
contracting is a mandatory subject of bargaining and that it would therefore be incon-
gruous to invalidate clauses over which the parties may be mandated to bargain. Id. at
642-43.
The Fibreboard case has led to employer demands for broad and detailed manage-
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The duty to bargain is not satisfied by the mere execution of a
contract. Collective bargaining is not a single act but a continuous
process. Thus, a union is entitled to information which will enable
it to perform its statutory duty of representing the employees. An
employer is often required to furnish the union with financial data in
order to sustain its plea of inability to increase wages. 129 The Board
has even required the employer to submit to union investigations of its
production methods. For example, in Fafnir Bearing Co.,'" the union
wanted to make its own time-and-motion study of production rates, in-
tending to use the results in deciding whether or not grievances then
in process should be taken to arbitration.131 The employer refused
permission and the union charged the employer with an unfair labor
practice. The Board held that the information sought was necessary
to allow the union to police and administer the agreement, and that
compliance with the requirement of good faith bargaining necessitated
ment rights or prerogative clauses. Through these clauses some employers have tried to
obtain contractual waivers of statutory rights of the Fibreboard character as well as
other management prerogatives in the management of their plants. The Board has found
that an employer's insistence on a clause of this character, together with other actions,
is inconsistent with his duty to bargain in good faith and thus is a § 8(a) (5) violation.
See, e.g., Stuart Radiator Core Mfg. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 69 L.R.R.M. 1243 (1968);
East Texas Steel Castings Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1080, 60 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1965). It has also
dismissed some § 8(a) (5) complaints of this character. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Mfg.
Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 334, 62 L.R.R.M. 1617 (1966). But clauses of this character are not
invalid per se, and it is entirely proper for an employer to try to spell out in the contract
the restrictions and the privileges of the bargaining relationship in this regard, within
the limitations of the statute. The leading decision in this area is NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952), where the Supreme Court stated:
The duty to bargain collectively is to be enforced by application of the good faith
bargaining standards of Section 8(d) to the facts of each case rather than by
prohibiting all employers in every industry from bargaining for management
functions clauses altogether.
Id. at 409. This area of the law probably will require further clarification in the years
ahead.
120 See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. (1956); Stanley Bldg. Special-
ties Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 65 L.R.R.M. 1684 (1967). In NLRB v. Frontier Homes
Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 64 L.R.R.M. 2320 (8th Cir. 1967), the court sustained a Board order
requiring the employer to supply the union with price lists.
130 146 N.L.R.B. 1582, 56 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1964).
131 Arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes has become increasingly impor-
tant. In 1955 the Board had decided that it would recognize arbitrators' awards if certain
safeguards were met. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
In 1960 the Supreme Court decided the Steelworkers' Trilogy, in which it indicated the
great value which it attached to arbitration. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior Sr Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
Since then numerous and complicated problems have come to the Board involving the
relationship between its processes and arbitration, and the extent to which the Board
should accept arbitration awards or remit cases to arbitration. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme
Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967): For a discussion of this problem, see Lev & Fishman,
Suggestions to Management: Arbitration v. the Labor Board, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 963 (1969).
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the company's cooperation, unless the union's request was improper
for another reason or imposed an unreasonable burden on the com-
pany."' Finding neither of these, the Board issued a bargaining order
which was enforced. 133
An employer must also inform a union of his intention to close
or sell all or part of his operations. This requirement gives the union
an opportunity to bargain about both the decision to close the opera-
tion and its effect upon the employees. Although the Board has not
yet determined if there is a duty to bargain about the decision to close
an operation completely, it has established that there is a duty to
bargain about a partial closing and its effect on the unit employees.'
This does not mean that the employer is forbidden to take action
the union opposes. It means only that he must discuss the matter
before acting. Thus, in Guardian Glass Co.,'35
 an employer who
had purchased a plant that had been incurring large losses, immediately
recognized the incumbent union and began bargaining in good faith
for modifications in the contract. The union was intransigent, and
an impasse ensued. The Board held that the employer had fulfilled
its duty to bargain about the decision to close, and that there bad
been no violation of the Act."
3. Length of the Bargaining Relationship
When a purchaser takes over a business where the employing in-
dustry remains essentially unchanged and there is a collective bargain-
ing representative, the new employer must recognize and bargain with
that representative.137
 Because this proposition has been established
for a long time, the problems which presently arise under it are largely
factual, as exemplified by such recent cases as Thomas Cadillac,
Inc.l's and Tallaksen Ford, Inc.'" The major question in this area
arises from the Supreme Court's decision in John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
132 146 N.L.R.B. at 1585, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1110.
133
 362 F.2d 716, 62 L.R.R.M. 2414 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Univis, Inc., 169
N.L.R.B. No. 18, 67 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1968).
134
 See, e.g., Morrison Cafeterias Consot., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 71 L.R.R.M.
1449 (1969); Drapery Mfr. Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 68 L.R.R.M. 1027 (1968); Ozark
Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966). It has also been established
that an employer must bargain with a union about the effects on employees of a man-
agement decision to go out of business completely. Interstate Tool Co., 177 N.L.R.B.
No. 107, 71 L.R.R.M. 1487 (1969).
133
 Guardian Glass Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 68 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1968).
130
 Id. at 4, 5, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1325.
137
 Ideal Laundry Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 69 L.R.R.M. 1349 (1968).
138 170 N.L.R.B. No. 92, 67 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1968) (no violation of the Act),
enforced sub nom. Lodge 94, IAM v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1135, 71 L.R.R.M. 2150 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
133
 171 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 68 L.R.R.M. 1136 (1968) (no violation of the Act).
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v. Livingston,'" where the Court held that where a successor took
over a business whose employees had been covered by a contract
which included an arbitration clause, the obligation to arbitrate sur-
vived the termination of the contract and devolved upon the successor,
even though it had not signed the contract.' The Court was con-
cerned with protecting the rights of the employees, who would not
normally be considered in the sale of a business, and attempted to pro-
vide some stability for ,them. For that reason, the question has arisen
whether, despite what could be considered a narrow holding based
upon the Court's view of the value of arbitration, the entire contract
should be held binding upon the successor."' Although the Board has
not yet decided this question, it has used the Wiley rationale to hold
that a purchaser who acquires and operates, in basically unchanged
form, the business of.an employer found guilty of unfair labor prac-
tices, in circumstances which charge the purchaser with notice of the
unfair labor practice charges against the predecessor, should be held
responsible, jointly and severally, with the predecessor for remedying
the unlawful conduce"
C. Section 8(b) (1) (A)
Since the Taft-Hartley amendments became law, the Act has pro-
hibited certain' unfair labor practices by unions. All of the unfair
labor practices specified in the Act will not be discussed here; rather
the emphasis will be upon section 8(b) (1) (A), 144 which makes it an
unfair labor practice for a Iabor organization or its agents to restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in sec-
tion 7:141' The Board at first narrowly interpreted this section as in-
hibiting only union tactics involving violence, intimidation, reprisals,
and threats of reprisa1. 1" That interpretation was expanded when
the Board's ruling in Bernhard-Altmann Tex. Corp. 141 was affirmed
in the Supreme Court, which held that the intent of Congress was to
140 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
141 Id. at 549-51.
142 Although there is a split of authority in the courts of appeals, the Supreme
Court has yet to decide this issue. Compare United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal,
Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 56 L.R.R.M. 2721 (3rd Cir. 1964) (contract not unqualifiedly binding
upon successor employer) with Wackenhut Corp. v. Local 151, United Plant Guard
Workers, 332 F.2d 954, 56 L.R.R.M. 2466 (9th Cir. 1964) (contract unqualifiedly binding
upon successor employer). This issue is currently before the Board in several cases.
143 Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 65 L.R.R,M. 1168, 1169 (1967), enforced
sub nom. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. N.L.R.B., 398 F.2d 544, 68 L.R.R.M.
2913 (5th Cir. 1968).
144 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
145 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
140 See, e.g., Painters' Dist. Council 6, 97 N.L.R.B. 654, 29 L.R.R.M. 1151 (1951);
National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 22 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1948).
147 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 43 L.R.R.M. 1283 (1959).
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impose upon unions the same restrictions that the Wagner Act had
imposed upon employers as to violations of employee rights.'
1. Union Discipline
A proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A) states that a union still has the
right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or reten-
tion of membership therein. In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co."
the Supreme Court, affirming the Board' ) and reversing the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 15 ' held that a union was not barred
under section 8(b) (1) (A) from fining members who crossed a union
picket line during an authorized strike.'" The Court stressed the
importance of the strike as a union weapon; the power to fine or
expel strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be able to function
as an effective bargaining agent.'53
Scofield v. NLRB' represents another situation in which it
was held that a union may fine its members without violating sec-
tion 8(b)(1 )(A). There, the union had a rule, enforceable by fines
and expulsion, that employees could produce as much as they wished
on any day, but could be paid only up to a ceiling rate. Any excess
earnings were retained by the company and paid to the employee for
days on which he did not reach the production ceiling. Those who
demanded immmediate payment of the excess would be paid at once,
but the union would fine them on a sliding scale. Failure to pay the
fine could lead to expulsion from the union. Although it was not con-
tained in a contract provision, the company and the union had dis-
cussed what the daily ceiling should be, and the company had agreed
to withhold the excess earnings. Members of the union brought an un-
fair labor practice charge against the union after it had fined the
members for demanding immediate payment of the excess earnings.
The Board dismissed the case,'" and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals1" and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a union can
generally enforce its rules internally against its members, but it can-
not enforce them externally by causing the employer to change the
member's employee status or rights.'" Since the union only enforced
the rule internally, the major issue was whether the internal rule
148 Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961).
149 N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
1" Local 248, UAW, 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 57 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1964).
191 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656, 61 L.R.R.M. 2498 (7th Cir.
1966).
152 388 U.S. at 195.
152 Id. at 181.
194 394 U.S. 421 (1969).
155 Local 1283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 55 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1964).
199 393 F.2d 49, 67 L.R.R.M. 2673 (7th Cir. 1968).
197 394 U.S. at 428.
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vindicated a legitimate union interest, and whether any policy of the
Act is violated by a union-imposed production ceiling.'" The Court
noted the historic union opposition to unlimited piecework pay sys-
tems,' the failure of the employer to achieve a removal of produc-
tion ceilings, and its cooperation in administering the system." The
Court also noted that the union's rule did not violate the contract,'"
that the employer did not pay for unperformed services,' 02 that
the union had not induced employer discrimination against any
class of employees,'" and the acceptable manner in which the rule
was enforced.'" It consequently held that the rule was valid, and that
its enforcement by reasonable fines was not a "restraint or coercion"
proscribed by section 8 (b) (1) (A). 1"
In deciding whether a fine or expulsion by the union is legal, the
object of the penalty must be scrutinized to insure that the union is
not impeding a member's access to the Board's processes."' The Board
has concluded that a union does impede access to the Board's processes
when it expels a member only because the member has filed charges
with the Board. 167 The Supreme Court recently sustained the Board's
position. In NLRB v. Indus. Union of Marine Workers,'" the union
had expelled a member for filing an unfair labor practice charge
against it without having first exhausted his intra-union remedies. The
Court stressed the right of an employee to ask the Board for relief,
and held that any coercion used to discourage exercise of that right
is beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization."
Another recent case in which the Board was faced with the validity
of union disciplinary action was Local 125, Int'l Molders,'" where
the union fined one of its employees for circulating a petition seek-
ing to have the Board decertify the union. The employee filed an
unfair labor practice charge against the union. The Board relied upon
Marine Workers, and found that the union had committed an unfair
188 Id. at 431.
188 Id.
160 Id. at 432-33.
161
 Id. at 433.
162 Id. at 434.
163 Id. at 435.
164 Id. at 436.
168 Id. The Board is currently considering a case which involves the definition of
a "reasonable fine."
160 See, e.g., Operating Engineers Local 138, 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009
(1964) (imposition of fine on union member for filing unfair labor practice charge held
to be a violation of § 8(b)(A)); H.R. Roberts, 148 N.L.R.B. 674, 57 L.R.R.M. 1012
(1964) (imposition of fine held to be in violation of § 8(h)(1)(A)).
167 See, e.g., Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 62 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1966).
168 NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
109 Id. at 424.
176 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969).
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labor practice by hindering the employee's access to the Board."'
In its decision the Board noted that a union may consider the
filing of a decertification petition an attack upon its very existence,
against which it may defend by expulsion or suspension of the mem-
ber who initiates it." On the other hand, the Board reasoned that a
fine, unlike a suspension or expulsion, was coercive and thus illegal:
[IN] here the union member is seeking to decertify the union,
the Board has said that the public policy against permitting
a union to penalize a member because he seeks the aid of
the Board should give way to the union's right to self-defense.
But when a union only fines a member because he has filed a
decertification petition, the effect is not defensive and can
only be punitive—to discourage members from seeking such
access to the Board's processes; the union is not one whit
better able to defend itself against decertification as a result
of the fine. The dissident member could still campaign
against the union while remaining a member and therefore
be privy to its strategy and tactics."
Member Jenkins and I dissented by noting that there is no
meaningful distinction between fines and expulsion.'" We also asserted
that Marine Workers was distinguishable from the Local 125 decision
in that in the former case the employee was expelled after filing an
unfair labor practice charge while in the latter case the employee
sought to decertify the union." We further argued that to forbid
fines for decertification petitions was to read the proviso out of
section 8 (b) (1) (A).1"
2. Duty of Fair Representation
In Vacs v. Sipesin the Supreme Court stated that a breach of
the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's
conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith.'" The Court did not decide whether
such action would in fact be a violation of section 8 (b) (1) (A), but
it did intimate that it might so hold. In Miranda Fuel Co.,'" the
171 Id. at 1, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1049.
172 Id. at 3, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1050. See also Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B.
46, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965).
. 173 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, at 3-4, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1050.
174 Id. at 6, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1051.
175 Id. at 8, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1051.
179 Id. at 10, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1052.
177 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
178 Id. at 190.
179 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172,
54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963).
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Board in fact held that section 8 (b) (1) (A) prevented a labor organi-
zation acting as a statutory representative from taking action against
any employee on the basis of considerations or classifications which are
irrelevant, invidious, or unfair.is° The Board therefore concluded that
the union's action in causing the reduction of an employee's seniority
in response to unjustified pressures from some unit employees was
unlawf ul.' 81
In Metal Workers Local 1 182 the same issue of fair representation
arose in the much more sensitive area of racial discrimination, and
the Board followed Miranda. The racial issue again arose in Rubber
Workers Local 12, 163
 and the Board adhered to its position. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in enforcing the Board's order, re-
jected a narrow view of section 8 (b) (1) (A) and agreed with the Board
that by refusing, for racially discriminatory reasons, to process griev-
ances concerning a racially discriminatory seniority system and segre-
gated plant facilities, the union had violated section 8(b) (1) (A). 184
III. BOARD JURISDICTION
During the 1960s the Board asserted jurisdiction over private
hospitals"' and nursing homes,' whose gross annual income exceeded
$250,000 and $100,000 respectively. The present size and expected
future growth of such institutions indicate that their impact on com-
merce is already substantial and will increase in the future.
The Board recently entered another previously unprotected field
with its assertion of jurisdiction over major league baseballs' It
rejected the argument that even though there was constitutional and
statutory power to do so, the exercise of jurisdiction would not
effectuate the policies of the Act. The Board concluded that should
future labor disputes arise in baseball, they would radiate far beyond
individual state boundaries, and that an employer conducting such
an operation ought not to have its labor relations problems subject
to diverse state labor laws. 188
180 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
181 Id. at 190, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1589.
182 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964).
183 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964).
184 Rubber Workers Local 12, 368 F.2d 12, 17, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395, 2398 (5th Cir.
1966). See also Local 568, Truck Drivers & Helpers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 65
L.R.R.M. 2309 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
185 Butte Medical Props., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 66 L.R.R.M. 1259 (1967).
186 University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 66 L.R.R.M. 1163 (1967).
187 American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 72
L.R.R.M. 1545 (1969).
188 Id. at 8, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1548.
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IV. REMEDIES
The most common unfair labor practice is still the discrimina-
tory discharge in violation of section 8(a) (3). From the earliest days
of the Board, the remedy for this has been reinstatement with back
pay,'" and in recent years the Board has attempted to reimburse
employees more fully. The most important changes in this respect
during the 1960s are the addition of interest to back pay awards,'"
and the reversal of the earlier holding that back pay is tolled for the
period between a Trial Examiner's ruling that no unfair labor practice
has been committed and its later reversal by the Board."'
The Board also confronted during the 1960s the problem of the
repeat violator, the notable example being J.P. Stevens & Co."'
Being of the view that the traditional back pay, reinstatement, and
posting of notice requirements were not sufficient, the Board added
new requirements. Stevens was ordered by the Board to (1) mail
copies of the notice to each employee at the affected plants; (2) upon
request of the union, grant it and its representatives reasonable access
at the affected plants, for one year, to its bulletin boards and all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted; (3) give to
the union, upon its request made within one year of the Board's deci-
sion, a list of names and addresses of all employees at the affected
plants; (4) convene during working hours, by departments and by
shifts, all of its employees at the affected plants, and to have a respon-
sible official of the corporation at a specified organizational level or
above, or a representative of the Board, read the notice to them."'
The opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals enforcing the
last Board decision involving J.P. Stevens expressed in strong language
the need for Board remedies which would be effective in keeping the
employer's intransigence within the bounds of vigorous but lawful
opposition to union efforts to organize.'" Rejecting Stevens' argument
that the Board's order made the lot of the union easier, the Court
189 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B, 1, 1 L.R.R.M. 303
(1935).
100 See, e.g., Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716, 51 L.R.R.M. 1122(1962).
101 See, e.g., A.P.W. Prods. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 25, 50 L.R.R.M. 1042 (1962).
192 See J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 61 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1966), enforced
in substantial part, 380 F.2d 292, 65 L.R.R.M. 2829 (2d Cir. 1967); 163 N.L.R.B. 217,
64 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1967), enforced as modified, 388 F.2d 896, 67 L.R.R.M. 2055 (2d
Cir. 1967); 167 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 66 L.R.R.M. 1024 (1967), enforced as modified, 406
F.2d 1017, 70 L.R.R.M. 2104 (4th Cir. 1968); 167 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 66 L.R.R.M. 1030,(1967), enforced as modified, 406 F.2d 1017, 70 L.R.R.M. 2104 (4th Cir. 1968); 171
N.L.R.B. No. 163, 69 L.R.R.M. 1088 (1968), enforced, 417 F.2d 533, 72 L.R.R.M. 2433
.(5th Cir. 1969).
108 See, e.g., 157 N.L.R.B. at 878-79, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1438.
194 417 F.2d at 535, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2434.
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answered that this was only because Stevens had made the union's lot
harder than the law tolerates.'"
There are many further proposals for providing more effective
remedies. Of these, perhaps the most significant is the proposal to
grant monetary compensation as a remedy for refusal by an employer
to bargain, a suggestion now before the Board in a series of cases.'
Where a union has been certified by the Board, and the employer,
challenging the election, refuses to bargain, the result allegedly has
been that employees often are denied the benefits of union representa-
tion, especially of a contract providing for higher pay and fringe
benefits, during the period of the litigation. The unions in the cases
now before the Board are seeking reimbursement for the loss of such
wages and benefits they claim they could have obtained through col-
lective bargaining. This proposal raises many complex problems the
Board will ultimately have to resolve: Does the Board have the legal
authority to effectuate such a remedy? Is the remedy invalid because
it is punitive or speculative? If reimbursement is ordered, how can
it be computed? Should there be a distinction between flagrant refusals
to bargain and the technical violation that is necessary if a represen-
tation case is to be reviewed in court?
V. ADMINISTRATION
During the 1960s the Board has experienced an enormous in-
crease in its caseload. In fiscal 1960, total case intake was somewhat
over 21,000 cases. In fiscal 1969, the total had risen to over 31,000
cases. This large amount of litigation imposes a responsibility to decide
cases rapidly. Remedies are of little use unless they can be applied
promptly. In recognition of this need, which was already apparent in
1959, the Landrum-Griffin amendments gave the Board the authority
to delegate to its regional directors its powers under section 9 in con-
nection with representation cases, subject to review by the Board upon
the request of any interested person.'" The Board has taken advantage
of that authority, and has found that the processing of representation
cases has been much expedited by its use, the time between the filing
of a petition and the direction of an election having been reduced to
an average of 45 days.
A similar type of delegation to Trial Examiners, with the Board
retaining discretionary authority for appellate review, might well have
comparably beneficial effects in the disposition of unfair labor practice
cases. This would not eliminate the present judicial review of Board
195 417 F.2d at 541, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2438.
196 See, e.g., Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 25-CA-2377; Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 26-CA-2536;
Zinke Foods, 30-CA-372.
197 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964).
830
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
decisions. The Board has estimated that between 100 and 140 days in
the handling of a case before it would be saved under this kind of pro-
cessing, depending upon whether a request for review was granted or
denied. This would also simplify the problem of providing prompt
remedies which, as noted above, is a continuing one. In 1961 this con-
cept was presented to Congress as a reorganization plan,"" but it was
not approved. It is submitted that the need is still present for this type
of plan.
Another proposal which could eliminate procedural delays is to
make Board orders self-enforcing after a given time, perhaps 45 days,
during which a respondent is given the opportunity to seek court
review. Under such a procedure, the lengthy span between the issuance
of Board and court orders would be shortened substantially, thereby
reducing the present attractiveness of continuing litigation in those
cases in which the legal issue may not warrant full judicial review.
Some courts are in fact experimenting with expedited procedures de-
signed to weed out those cases in which the full panoply of argument is
not required. 14°
CONCLUSION
The decade which lies ahead, of course, is not predictable in
detail. But the future grows from and perhaps is implicit in the past.
Experience teaches that the social, economic, industrial, and cultural
changes which are now taking place will be reflected in the issues
presented to the Board for decision. Population growth, the need
for more jobs, inflation, automation, product and process changes,
foreign competition, the human rights upsurge, new corporate manage-
ment concepts, new union bargaining techniques, the problems of
proverty for many of our citizens, the increasing youth and improved
education and training of our work force, will all create labor-manage-
ment relations problems which ultimately will be reflected in Board
decisions.
Over the years it has been widely accepted that the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, embodies a policy geared to meet
changing economic conditions and to confine labor-management dis-
putes to the peaceful arena of collective bargaining. The Board can be
justifiably proud to have played a major part in the effectuation of
this policy.
108 Reorganization Plan No. 5, proposed in accordance with the Reorganization Act
of 1949, 63 Stat. 203, as amended.
100 See, e.g., the discussion of Chief Judge Brown in Huth v. Southern Pac. Co.,
417 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1969).
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